The "Hobbesian turn" is an invention out of whole cloth, a device by which to oppose the usually supposed autonomy of the aesthetic, the moral, the political, and the factual; to recover the collective holism of civilizational (or enlanguaged cultural) life; to feature the existential historicity of the human career, which is incompatible with any strict universalism and all the forms of transcendentalism; hence, also, to feature the adequacy of a contingent Lebensform in collecting the affinities of creative expression and agentive commitment within the terms of human solidarity; to abandon strict universality and necessary synthetic truths; and to favour the fluxive world of pragmatist construction rather than the indemonstrable fixities of rationalism and transcendentalism. The article proceeds largely by examining aspects of Picasso's career and the history of Western politics spanning the sixteenth century to the present.
existential historicity of the human career, which is incompatible with any strict universalism and all the forms of transcendentalism; hence, also, to feature the adequacy of a contingent Lebensform in collecting the affinities of creative expression and agentive commitment within the terms of human solidarity; to abandon strict universality and necessary synthetic truths; and to favour the fluxive world of pragmatist construction rather than the indemonstrable fixities of rationalism and transcendentalism. The article proceeds largely by examining aspects of Picasso's career and the history of Western politics spanning the sixteenth century to the present. I'm persuaded, rather, that we are entering the third phase of a perfectly legible history of distinctly modern politics -fraught with more than ordinary danger -that, from the sixteenth century to the present, has already passed through two prolonged phases distinctive of the West: absolute monarchy and a variety of republican replacements; and is now poised for a third phase that doubtless will borrow in a fresh way elements drawn from the first two phases, now embedded and emboldened in global politics, that may (or may not) be able to leaven the deepening insecurities of our technologized world, which everyone has good reason to fear.
My own rather dismal prophecy (I sincerely hope I'm mistaken) is that we are likely to favour one or another form of totalitarian closure and security -within the bounds of which what is usually
The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics, No. 55-56 (2018), pp. 23-40 called democratic socialism would have been a welcome option but which I doubt is likely to prevail. Here, we find an enlarged need for conjectural options that have come to be called "social imaginaries": imminent possibilities of political practice, to be precise, drawn from incompletely resolved past insecurities rather than deemed now to be foundationally valid -prudent (in Hobbes' careful sense) more than demonstrably correct in any moral or constitutional way. 2 There is, I concede, no single correct use of the expression, "social imaginary" and no assured political prophecy but increased insecurity. 3 My own preference, here, is noticeably shallow, though not unrepresentative or inapt, or unwilling to yield to deeper or more explicit dispositions. In fact, my untutored guess is that cyber technology will assuredly play an increasingly important, partially invisible role, in generating new forms of collective insecurity and in protecting us from same -which suggests the possible congruity of totalitarian options. Seventeenth-century monarchy and eighteenth-and nineteenth-century democracy and republicanism may have suited the prominence of various sorts of individualism that are now being altered or displaced. If so, then there may be a deceptively valid token politics in my conjecture. And if that proves true, then I'm prepared to believe that it will affect artistic, interpretive, and other civilizational sensibilities conformably.
To my knowledge, no one has discussed the Hobbesian aesthetic -as distinct from the Hobbesian politic, which I myself advance with some misgiving, since I take it to be a placeholder for innumerable substitutions of an entwined account of the political and the aesthetic, that I have yet to draft satisfactorily. I treat responsive expression (as in the arts) and responsive commitment (as in politics) as very similar to one another (interpretively) -in terms of the logic of judgment and argument, as well as in being closer to what is thoroughly existential in human life than what is usually urged, say, in executive inquiries regarding morality and the natural sciences. That, however, I concede, may be no more than a personal impression, though it has the effect of demoting the would-be autonomy of moral and factual questions. I treat the primacy of the existential as a factual or ontological discovery -not the cognitive yield of a privileged faculty.
In any event, the two sorts of inquiry appear to converge in their preference for genre-like and prototypical or analogical forms of inference: highly informal, ad hoc, opportunistic, context-bound; unquestionably contingent though logically fortified in drawing on the latent inferential features of mundane discourse itself; most successful in ordinary and familiar, even if specialized, exchanges, but as averse to settled forms of constitutionalism as its predecessors.
In reading Hobbes under the shadow of the remarkable glosses provided by figures that belong to our own time, visionary figures like Carl Schmitt and perhaps Giorgio Agamben, whose political guesses, I must admit, are unpleasantly close to my own -or mine to theirs, 4 I mean to feature at least four linked but distinct convictions that are largely settled, factually, as far as the political side of the story is concerned, and that prove at least as instructive when approached in aesthetic terms or (at an even deeper level of analysis) "existentially" (as I prefer to say) -which I associate with a reconceptualization of pragmatism: first, then, the ontological primacy of flux over fixity, which, applied to the human world or to human cognition, takes the unique and ineluctable form of historicity: that's to say, the benign scepticism that reminds us that we always exceed, by temporal extension, (mere history) the evidentiary sources of past cognition, without ever reaching the end of time or necessary truths about the world (that can never be overturned); second, historicity itself, the primal theme of the existentiality of specifically human life (as expression and commitment), that signifies the impossibility of any strictly rationalist or transcendentalist (totalized) closure applied to the world we claim to inhabit -inasmuch as transcendentalism is no more than a species of rationalism committed to the necessary or apodictic systematicity of the whole of reality (as, most notably, in Husserl's Crisis volume, 5 though also in Kant); third, the discovery that the contract theory of political legitimation (nominally, Hobbes' theory), said to ensure sovereignty, constitutionality, the rule of law, and similar normative constraints deemed conceptually unavoidable, which is itself a futile regress (already known to Hobbes), since the stipulated "state of nature" is never rightly overcome or displaced (constructively) but only paradoxically installed within the bounds of Leviathan itself -thereby obscuring the deeper truth that political order (however, or if ever, legitimated) may be unconditionally risked (beyond all would-be legitimative measures) by proclaiming what, following Hobbes, both Schmitt and Agamben are prepared to affirm as "a state of exception" said to threaten or defeat the mortal existence and viability of whatever we might otherwise claim to have constructed, contractually, as a valid state (the explicit purpose of Hobbes' contract); and, fourth, the increasingly intractable dangers and insecurities that uniquely mark our contemporary world -largely of our own making, but potentially
The Hobbesian Turn unmanageable and fearsome, existentially primary in the face of the dwindling assurances of conventional norms (monarchical, republican, democratic, liberal) -that may indeed begin to count as permanent "states of exception," likely to be thoroughly lawless (in the rationalist sense), very possibly incoherent as well, and at the same time totalitarian in intent (a thoroughly unpalatable mixture).
Nevertheless, I think we may be approaching just such a juncture now -which will require its own aesthetic. Count that a "real imaginary," by which artistic expression and interpretive response (existentially informed) never fail to reflect the perceived human condition.
We continue, of course -we must continue -to speak of sovereignty, constitutionality, and their successors; but we must also confess we lack a fully articulated fluxive alternative to the demands of rationalism and transcendentalism. (We cannot continue as before). There is a recuperative practice to be reclaimed, but it's admittedly difficult to define or trust. Nevertheless, I
find an unlikely but thoroughly plausible and promising clue, My first two dicta provide for the defeat of classic rationalism and transcendentalism (chiefly directed against Kant), which I address in the second half of the paper. The other two dicta identify the paradoxes that confront the Hobbesian aesthetic itself, which we must find a way of resolving, and which I explore, as I say, tentatively, by way of some notes regarding Picasso's adventurous practice as a very early twentieth-century expression of the same mid-nineteenth-century artistic revolution that continues to evolve beyond the enthusiasms of Picasso's time. I begin to address these puzzles in the first half of the paper, guided by the precept that we must match the courage of the new liberty of artistic expression (already beyond its first hundred years) with a comparable courage suited to a political commitment capable of resolving the threatening paradoxes of our actual political situation. My intention is to strengthen the existential and historied nature of our aesthetic responses, which is at best a second thought in Kant's account. 
I
My intuition is that political behaviour and the expression and interpretation of the artistic impulse are as close to the primal sources of purposive human life at its most existential that we could ever expect to isolate; and that, in spanning collective action and commitment and the public codification of our expressive responses to the human condition -artfully intertwined -we have indeed begun to occupy the "Hobbesian aesthetic." This is already more than a guess, but, also, less than a theory. Goya, whom I more than admire, may be assuredly counted a compelling exemplar.
But then, admitting more contrived modes of expression and the continual deflection of democratic energies, so, too, is the Picasso of early cubism and Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. At any rate, I have no easy formula of the Hobbesian aesthetic: it's merely one of a multitude of pertinent possibilities. What I offer, however, has the merit of favouring the holist unity of collective life, which standard philosophical theories of the moral and the aesthetic (the Kantian, preeminently) tend to ignore. The mere aggregation of individual lives neglects the political altogether; and the moral (at its most universal) tends to be bloodless, utopian, indifferent to sittlich origins, as well as distinctly ahistorical -which is to say, as indifferent to the existential as one can imagine. True language, I remind you, is inherently collective: the central meanings of its words and the meaning of all we can discern (say) and usefully interpret discursively in both the political world and the art world.
Cognition, I suggest, is not autonomous but existentially dependent at a deeper level of animal life than can be accounted for by way of the mastery of natural language. Language accounts for the paradigmatic role of discursive knowledge; but the absence of discursive concepts at the animal level (nearest the human) accounts I also find the disjunctive treatment of legal, aesthetic, political, cognitive, interpretive, theoretical, and practical judgments utterly unconvincing, counter-intuitive, in fact -especially as, on the condition given, cognition is itself existentially qualified,
The Hobbesian Turn primordially animal, inseparable from its well-known petitio and endless regress, insuperably contingent, no more than passingly reliable, approximatively diverse, abductive rather than fallible in any infinitist way. 9 I regard this sort of construction as a proper glimpse of what pragmatism comes to in our time: a firmer but more concessive tolerance of what can never be brought to any asymptotic close. I take the human form of life to be uniquely historied or historicized (that is, the lives of selves or personsnot mere primates); and I hold that historied and rationalist (hence, also, transcendental) forms of cognition are simply incompatible.
Hence, exceptionlessly universal, apodictic, unconditionally necessary truths beyond the analytic and the logical are never more 
II
You must bear in mind that Braque, the shyer (but also, it seems, the more articulate of the two allies, who, together, launch cubism without much in the way of preliminary explanation), had himself Whatever may be found in the world -it may be said -makes its visual contribution to the chance unity of whatever construction or selection of things within the world we happen to favour. For
The Hobbesian Turn In fact, the entire history of Western politics, from the sixteenth century to the present, has effectively eliminated the determinacy of any rule of sovereignty, the demonstrable constitutionality of law, the primary political function of moral truths, the wouldbe "rule of law" itself, and the universal consensus or assured validity of the true objectives of political life. Imagine! All that is gone now -or reduced to utopian pronouncements that have all but lost their strictest function. Contemporary politics is guided, rather, by the temporal drift of prudential interests regarding the collective power and security of a constitutive people and the legible declension of evolving practice. We proceed by prudential habitude, but argue from principle. Nevertheless, security is existential, mortal, immediately compelling, primordial, ultimate, unsettling, consensually committed beyond any determinate rules; and the creativity of the entire run of the geistlich world -endlessly and diversely productive, expressive, aesthetically engaged, interpretively responsive -cannot be more than allusively confined, as we've just witnessed, in coming to understand Picasso as the vaunted "painter of modern life." Expression is the existential voice that anticipates political commitment: the "theory of interpretation," therefore, cannot fail to accord with the "theory of human practices." But that is of course the Hobbesian aesthetic: the drift from would-be foundational rules (or laws) to opportunistic (but prudential) habitudes. Picasso is, for a longish time, our principal exemplar -disputed (but often, even uncomprehendingly, followed by gifted and ungifted artists alike) into an increasingly disenchanted world of chance marketable expression.
Wherever the supposed rules of painting are enforced (as, selfdeceptively, among the academic salons of nineteenth-century France), we have only to invent (it seems) a maverick canon, abandon the older rules, and vie for one or another form of entrepreneurial hegemony. The surprising success of an entire family of cubisms provides the compelling evidence; and the wary competition between Picasso and Matisse confirms the uncertainty of its market life. It may be that our world is changing too quickly to live by strict rules. My own surmise favours instead Wittgenstein's thoroughly unbewildred pronouncement: "When I obey a rule," Wittgenstein observes, "I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly." 11 I find this as much a law of the artworld and of politics and science, as it is of ordinary language. Out of necessity, we live improvisationallywithout any explicitly closed order -rationally, by approximative tolerances, felt but never precisely measured. We are continually confronted by the impossibility of human fixity. We have eclipsed the salient forms of rationalist closure and find ourselves beset by the deepening insecurities of guarding every form of information and possession. Every age will have its own politics and interpretive zeal. Ours, on the edge of the most daring (most inviting and most dangerous) technologies ever imagined, is obliged to eclipse the proprieties of all past forms of expression and commitment that the race has ever conceived. Part, but only part, of this is centred on the fear of the robotic and the cyborg.
Politically, I think it very possible that the third phase of our extended history will favour a range of totalitarian closure with no more than a dwindling tolerance of democratic liberty that may meet some of Hobbes' up-dated security concerns. In that case, such themes (and the treatment of such themes) as are favoured in Picasso's Demoiselles and (say) Guernica may prove prophetic for a season. In any event, something of the kind is indeed the key to the convergence of the political and the aesthetic as the world made its turn into the twentieth century. I find it more than plausibly confirmed by the Second World War and the deepening turn into the twenty-first century.
To be entirely candid: What I sense here is the increasing rationalization of large parts of the production of managed truths regarding political, economic, medical, moral, religious, artistic, scientific, and allied forms of information and property, increasingly difficult to examine and test directly in any independently confirmable ways -locally or reliably -at the same time our
The Hobbesian Turn expressive capacities are directed to responding meaningfully to the world as it is thus presented. (Very often, even now, we cannot say whether we are inside or outside the bureaucratic "camp" -which is to say: we are "inside"). There may even be competing systems of such political spaces, state-centred or not. (The artworld always has a surfeit of uncommitted energy). In that sense, the expression and interpretation of our collective identity can afford to remain relatively latent (though easily awakened) in the studio and museum. (It rarely strays far from the political). Nearly all that we say and do obliquely involves that identity. There's the clue to the social integrity of any sizable aggregate of self-directed lives. We absorb the culture of our homeland and we are thereby effectively primed for possible political engagement, as well as for the interpretation of our culture. (The two go hand in hand).
III
The articulation of the political yields a fresh theory of art and the interpretation of art. Its best contribution is that of the dawning sufficiency of practice itself: there is no higher normativity to be had. There's the force of historicity. Our political (and artistic) future has already been partially limned.
We must play out the hand we've dealt ourselves.
The earlier defeat -if I may now call it that -in the nineteenth century, of French academic painting, primed by the initiatives of Manet and his contemporaries and successors, who plied their professional skills entrepreneurially, reminds us that artistic imagination was and is now obliged to create a loyal audience for its altered fashions, at the same time it seeks to sell its wares in the open market. The "hegemonies" of the Hobbesian aesthetic continually alter the mapping of our existential world. Picasso is its most stunning -late -exemplar.
Social imaginaries are the relatively stable collective presences with which a "hegemonic" (ideologically dominant) power (in either politics or art or elsewhere) may realistically consider an accommodating alliance by which to advance the fortunes of cooperating (usually transient) "collectives" in an effort to displace the competing objectives of ventures opposed to the new initiative. The openness, the creative tolerance, say, of the world of post-academic painting, in France, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, is more easily supported than specifically political imaginaries -but it is also often more difficult to interpret accurately in hegemonic terms. It may contribute nevertheless to an ethos hospitable to expressive and potentially political innovations with regard to our existential world. The idea of an intertwining of the political and the aesthetic yields a very plausible (and ample) sketch of the shifting historical orientation of contemporary commitment and expressive imagination ranging over the whole of our civilizational concerns -collected in every possible way against the closure of the totalitarian. I intend all of this informally, but not without conviction. That's to say, the Hobbesian aesthetic is itself a prescient political "imaginary" on the edge of a new encounter with the demands of modern -collective and technologized -life.
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